The survival of a modern state is inseparable from its capacity to guarantee security within its territorial boundaries. Where the authority of the state is unable to protect life, property and constitutional order, governance becomes nominal and development aspirational rather than real.
In Nigeria’s contemporary experience, persistent internal security threats have exposed not merely operational weaknesses but deeper structural deficiencies in the manner national defence is conceived, financed and prioritised. Central among these deficiencies is the treatment of defence expenditure as a discretionary budgetary item, vulnerable to delay, political bargaining and fiscal uncertainty.
This approach is incompatible with the realities of modern security management and undermines the constitutional purpose of the Nigerian state. Under Nigeria’s constitutional framework, security is not an incidental function of government. Section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution unambiguously declares that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government. This provision establishes a hierarchy of state obligations, placing security above all other governmental objectives.
Yet the fiscal architecture through which public resources are allocated fails to reflect this constitutional priority. Defence funding remains subject to annual appropriation negotiations, delayed cash releases, supplementary budgeting, and executive discretion in implementation. The result is a persistent gap between constitutional intent and administrative reality.
The concept of a first line charge in public finance law is neither novel nor controversial. It refers to categories of expenditure that are automatically charged to the Consolidated Revenue Fund and settled before other discretionary spending. The justification lies in the nature of the functions involved. Debt servicing, judicial remuneration and certain statutory transfers are accorded this status because interruption or delay would imperil the stability of the state or the rule of law. Defence expenditure shares, and indeed surpasses, these characteristics.
A state that cannot defend itself or maintain internal security forfeits the very basis upon which its fiscal system rests. Modern military operations demand predictability. Procurement cycles span years, not months. Training regimes require continuity. Intelligence gathering depends on sustained investment.
Troop welfare cannot be subjected to erratic releases or fiscal improvisation. Where defence funding is unstable, the consequences are cumulative and corrosive. Equipment acquisition is delayed, maintenance backlogs grow, morale deteriorates and operational effectiveness declines.
These failures are often misattributed to leadership or doctrine, when in truth they stem from structural underfunding and fiscal inconsistency. Placing defence expenditure on a first line charge would not immunise it from oversight nor would it remove it from democratic accountability. Rather, it would ensure that funding is timely, predictable, and commensurate with operational demands.
National Assembly scrutiny, audit mechanisms and classified reporting procedures would remain intact. The distinction lies not in the absence of oversight, but in the elimination of uncertainty. National defence cannot be contingent upon quarterly cash releases or shifting political priorities. The argument for reform becomes even more compelling during periods of declared national security emergency.
Emergencies, by definition, justify departures from ordinary administrative procedures. In such circumstances, rigid adherence to conventional budgetary frameworks becomes counterproductive. The state’s obligation is to respond with speed, coherence and decisiveness. This requires pragmatic adjustments to funding mechanisms, including front loaded defence expenditure, expedited procurement processes and enhanced intergovernmental cooperation.
In this context, the role of state governments assumes particular significance. Although defence is constitutionally vested in the Federal Government, insecurity is territorially experienced and economically localised. Armed violence disrupts state economies, displaces populations, erodes internally generated revenue and undermines local governance.
It is therefore neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional for States to contribute directly to defence efforts during periods of acute insecurity. Such contributions do not amount to the creation of parallel armed forces, nor do they encroach upon federal authority. Rather, they reflect the logic of cooperative federalism, whereby different tiers of government collaborate to address shared existential threats.
Defence funding must reflect the reality that security is foundational to all other governmental functions
State contributions may lawfully take several forms. Financial support from security votes may be directed towards logistics, accommodation, infrastructure, or joint operations. States may provide land for military installations, support intelligence coordination, or co-fund task forces operating within their territories.
These measures enhance operational effectiveness while respecting constitutional boundaries. During national security emergencies, such cooperation should not be optional or ad hoc but structured, transparent and legally grounded. International practice supports this approach.
In the United States, defence funding is treated as a non-negotiable priority. Even during federal government shutdowns, essential military operations continue uninterrupted. Emergency defence appropriations are authorised swiftly and state governments contribute substantially through the funding and deployment of National Guard units. This dual funding structure reflects an understanding that security is both a national and local responsibility. Israel presents an even starker example.
Faced with persistent existential threats, Israel accords defence absolute priority in fiscal planning. Defence expenditure is automatically elevated during emergencies, often at the expense of civilian programmes. Local authorities cooperate closely with military institutions, providing logistical and infrastructural support. This model underscores the principle that when national survival is at stake, fiscal orthodoxy must yield to security necessity.
The United Kingdom, though operating within a different constitutional tradition, similarly treats defence as a protected expenditure. Multi-year spending settlements provide predictability, while NATO commitments impose minimum funding thresholds. During periods of heightened threat, emergency powers enable rapid augmentation of defence and internal security budgets. Local authorities routinely collaborate with central government during domestic security operations, reflecting a shared responsibility for national safety.
In Pakistan, defence spending enjoys de facto first-line status, particularly during internal security operations. Provincial governments support federal forces through logistics, infrastructure, and intelligence cooperation. While oversight challenges persist, the prioritisation of defence reflects a recognition of the state’s security realities.
France, under its state-of-emergency framework, likewise prioritises defence and internal security funding, granting the executive expanded fiscal latitude while maintaining parliamentary review. These examples illustrate a common principle: serious states do not subject their defence apparatus to fiscal uncertainty. Whether through constitutional designation, statutory protection, or established practice, defence funding is prioritised, stabilised and insulated from routine political fluctuation.
Nigeria’s challenge lies not in the absence of models, but in the reluctance to adapt its fiscal framework to its security environment. The relationship between security and development further strengthens the case for reform. Security is not merely a precondition for development; it is an integral component of it.
Insecure regions repel investment, disrupt education and healthcare, and accelerate capital flight. Infrastructure cannot be built or maintained amid violence. Human capital deteriorates when communities are displaced or traumatised. Conversely, improved security restores confidence, stimulates economic activity and enables effective service delivery. Defence expenditure, when properly managed, is therefore not a drain on development but an enabler of it.
Critics of first-line defence funding often raise concerns about transparency and abuse. These concerns are legitimate but not insurmountable. The solution lies not in underfunding security, but in strengthening oversight mechanisms. National Assembly defence, army, air force and navy committees can be empowered with enhanced review authority.
The Auditor-General can conduct classified audits. Procurement processes can be subjected to judicial scrutiny where appropriate. Accountability and security are not mutually exclusive; they are mutually reinforcing. Implementing first-line defence funding in Nigeria would require legal reform.
This could take the form of a constitutional amendment explicitly recognising defence as a first-line charge or statutory provisions mandating automatic releases during declared security emergencies. A hybrid approach, combining constitutional recognition with detailed enabling legislation, may offer the most balanced solution.
Similarly, State contributions during emergencies should be governed by clear legal frameworks defining scope, limits and accountability. Ultimately, the question is not whether Nigeria can afford to prioritise defence, but whether it can afford not to. A state that negotiates its survival annually through uncertain budgetary processes risks strategic paralysis. Defence funding must reflect the reality that security is foundational to all other governmental functions.
By placing defence expenditure on a first-line charge and mandating structured state governments contributions during national security emergencies, Nigeria will align its fiscal architecture with its constitutional purpose and security imperatives. History shows that states often lose wars not from lack of capacity, but from lack of decisiveness. The national security emergency declaration must not remain a administrative circular ,rather all the necessary actions must be provided.
